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Abstract. In the early-to-mid 1930s, Wittgenstein investigated solipsism via the 
philosophy of language. In this paper, I want to reopen Wittgenstein’s 
‘grammatical’ examination of solipsism. 
Wittgenstein begins by considering the thesis that only I can feel my pains. 
Whilst this thesis may tempt us towards solipsism, Wittgenstein points out that 
this temptation rests on a grammatical confusion concerning the phrase ‘my 
pains’. In §1, I unpack and vindicate his thinking. 
After discussing ‘my pains’, Wittgenstein makes his now famous discussion 
that the word ‘I’ has two distinct uses: a subject-use and an object-use. The 
purpose of Wittgenstein’s suggestion has, however, been widely misunderstood. I 
unpack it in §2, explaining how the subject-use connects with a phenomenological 
language, and so again tempts us into solipsism. In §§3–4, I consider various 
stages of Wittgenstein’s engagement with this kind of solipsism, culminating in a 
rejection of solipsism (and of subject-uses of ‘I’) via reflections on private 
languages. 
1  The privacy of pain 
In the early-to-mid 1930s,1 Wittgenstein frequently considers the following:2  
                                                 
1 The source materials are all published posthumously. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1964, ed. by Rush Rhees), written around 1930. Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein: 
Lectures, Cambridge 1930–1933 (from the notes of G.E. Moore) (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016, ed. by D. G. Stern et al.); all citations are from Wittgenstein’s ‘Philosophy’ lectures in 
February–March 1933, and are given as Philosophy (Moore). Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein’s Lectures: 
Cambridge, 1932–5 (from the notes of Alice Ambrose and Margaret MacDonald) (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1979, ed. by Alice Ambrose); all citations are from the same lectures as before, and are given as 
Philosophy (Ambrose). Wittgenstein, The Blue Book (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958); dictated in 1933–34. 
Wittgenstein, ‘Notes for lectures on “private experience” and “sense data”’, The Philosophical Review 
77.3 (1968), 275–320; these are lectures notes from 1934–6, and citations are given as NLPESD. 
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Privacy Thesis. I, and only I, can feel my pains.  
I will first show how this Thesis can tempt us into solipsism, and then show how 
to avoid that temptation. 
1.1  A conceptual problem 
Traditionally, the Privacy Thesis is a springboard to an epistemological problem: 
How can I know that someone else is in pain? Although Wittgenstein sometimes 
speaks of knowledge, for him the Thesis is primarily a springboard to a conceptual 
problem: What could I possibly mean in speaking of ‘someone else’s pain’?  
Roughly put, the problem is this. Given the Privacy Thesis, I feel my own 
pains. As such, I will claim to understand fully what I mean by saying ‘I am in 
pain’. But, precisely because my pains are mine, there is no way for me to ascribe 
them to someone else. And this curtails what I could possibly mean by saying ‘he 
is in pain’. 
To get this problem rolling, consider the following passage from Wittgenstein:  
As an explanation of the proposition ‘he has toothache’, one says roughly: ‘very simple: I know 
what it means that I have toothache, and if I say that he has toothache, I mean that he has now what 
I had then’. But what does ‘he’ mean, and what does ‘to have toothache’ mean? Is this a relation 
which the toothache had to me then and now has to him[?] Then I too would now be conscious of 
the toothache, and of his now having it, as I can now see a wallet in his hand which I earlier saw in 
mine.3  
To defend the attempted ‘simple’ explanation against this line of thought, one 
might reply as follows:  
‘Of course pain is not like a wallet, which I might pass from me to him. What I mean is that his 
pain is now of the same type as my earlier pain. If you must talk in terms of wallets, then think of 
my pain and his pain as two similar wallets, which cannot leave our pockets.’  
But, when the Privacy Thesis is read a certain way, it blocks any reply along these 
lines, for the Thesis precludes anyone else from having my pain (type).4 What we 
need is a way to ‘map’ my pain (type) over to you. But, it is just unclear how we 
could even try to effect this mapping. As Wittgenstein splendidly put problem:  
                                                                                                                                      
Wittgenstein, The Big Typescript (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005, ed. by C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue); 
this manuscript was composed in 1933–37. 
2 Wittgenstein: Philosophical Remarks, §§61–5; Philosophy (Moore), 7:109–114, 8:6–16; Philosophy 
(Ambrose), §16; The Blue Book, 48ff.; NLPESD, 283. See also Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), §253. 
3 Wittgenstein: Philosophical Remarks, §62; The Big Typescript, 503, and also 510–11. 
4 Anticipating §1.4, below: here the grammar of ‘my pain’ is doing too much heavy-lifting. 
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—It is as if I were told: “Here is a chair. Can you see it clearly?—Good—now translate it into 
French!”5  
At this point, then, I will want to ask: What can I mean by saying ‘he is in pain’, 
or ‘he hurts’? There are a few options, but none of them seems very good. For 
example, I could suggest that ‘he hurts’ means that he is behaving (physically) as I 
do when I am in pain. Now, no doubt this suggestion is far too crude to handle all 
the varied uses of ‘he hurts’; I would need to draw a more sophisticated link 
between ‘he hurts’ and (dispositions to) behaviour. But, given the Privacy Thesis, 
the problem is that anything I could hope to mean by ‘he hurts’ could be rooted 
only in what is physically observable.6 And that is a far cry, it seems, from what I 
mean when I say ‘I hurt’. 
1.2  Zeugmas and solipsism 
So now suppose I consider the predicate ‘x hurts’, as it occurs in the two 
expressions ‘I hurt’ and ‘he hurts’. Given what has come before, I will want to 
insist that ‘it is no longer [the] same function just with different arguments.’7 
Rather, I will insist that it has a very different meaning in these two occurrences. 
So, I will advocate the following:  
Dual-Meaning Thesis. The predicate ‘x hurts’ really ‘has two meanings, one for me and one for 
the other person’.8  
Indeed, I will regard ‘you and I hurt’ as a bad zeugma, on a par with ‘I threw up 
and down’.9 
Consequently, I will want to mark a distinction between the predicate which I 
use for me, and the predicate I apply to everyone else. Given the Privacy Thesis, I 
cannot doubt that my pains are real, so I will reserve ‘x really-hurts’ for me. By 
contrast, I have been led to the view that it is unintelligible to think that anyone 
else experiences (my) real pain. So, when it comes to other people, instead of 
saying ‘x hurts’, I will say ‘x kinda-hurts’. (As suggested above, the sense I attach 
                                                 
5 Wittgenstein, Zettel (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981, ed. by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. v. Wright), §547. 
6 For discussion on these themes, see Wittgenstein Philosophy (Moore), 7:109, 7:111–12; Philosophy 
(Ambrose), §16; The Blue Book, 57; NLPESD, 286, 296. 
7 Wittgenstein Philosophy (Moore), 8:23; see also Philosophy (Moore), 8:11, 8:26, 8:30; Philosophy 
(Ambrose), §18. 
8 Wittgenstein, NLPESD, 319; see also Philosophy (Moore) 7:109–10, 8:12; The Blue Book, 72–3. Cf. 
also Donald Davidson’s suggestion on how to formulate scepticism about other minds in ‘First-person 
authority’, Dialectica 38.2/3 (1974), 101–11. 
9 Thanks to Brian King for this excellent example. 
4 
to ‘x kinda-hurts’ might be in the ballpark of ‘x’s body behaves like mine, when I 
really-hurt’.) Then, using this new vocabulary, I will say the following:  
Solipsistic Thesis. Only I can really-hurt, and it makes no sense even to suppose that someone else 
might really-hurt. 
But I have called this Thesis ‘Solipsistic’, since it is exactly how Wittgenstein 
characterises solipsism in The Blue Book: 
[the solipsist] wishes to restrict the epithet “real” to what we should call his experiences; and 
perhaps he doesn’t want to call our experiences “experiences” at all. For he would say that it is 
inconceivable that experiences other than his own were real.10 
[…] the solipsist asks: How can we believe that the other has pain; what does it mean to believe 
this? How can the expression of such a supposition make sense?11  
Note that, as befits a ‘grammatical’ investigation of solipsism, this characterisation 
of solipsism is meaning-theoretic. But the short point is this: I will have been led 
from the Privacy Thesis, via the Dual-Meaning Thesis, to some version of 
solipsism. 
1.3  From solipsism to selfless solipsism 
In fact, we can characterise this version of solipsism a bit more precisely. 
Consider the following reasonable thesis, due to Evans:  
Compositional Constraint. If we hold that the subject’s understanding of ‘Fa’ and his 
understanding of ‘Gb’ are structured, we are committed to the view that the subject will also be 
able to understand the sentences ‘Fb’ and ‘Ga’.12  
Now consider what happens when the Solipsistic Thesis meets the Compositional 
Constraint. For reductio, suppose that I understand both ‘I really-hurt’ and ‘Ali 
kinda-hurts’ as having a subject/predicate structure. Then, by the Compositional 
Constraint, I will also be able to understand the sentence ‘Ali really-hurts’. But the 
Solipsistic Thesis states that this makes no sense. So, I must understand at least 
one of ‘I really-hurt’ or ‘Ali kinda-hurts’ as not having a subject/predicate 
structure. However, my understanding of ‘Ali kinda-hurts’ surely does have that 
structure: there is nothing objectionable about replacing ‘Ali’ with ‘he’, or ‘you’, 
                                                 
10 Wittgenstein The Blue Book, 59. See also Philosophy (Moore), 8:6, 8:8–9; The Blue Book, 46, 57, 61. 
11 Wittgenstein The Blue Book, 48. See also The Blue Book, 56; NLPESD, 276–7. 
12 Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, ed. John McDowell), 
101. The entire quote is from Evans, but the name is mine (Evans introduces this Constraint en route to 
his famous Generality Constraint). 
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or any other term which picks out a human being.13 So, I must conclude that ‘I 
really-hurt’ does not have a subject/predicate structure after all. And, since it is 
hard to see how it could have any other structure, I must accept that my 
understanding of ‘I really-hurt’ is unstructured.  
This, however, has a surprising upshot. When I say ‘I really-hurt’ – which, 
given the Dual-Meaning Thesis, was just a way for me to say ‘I hurt’ more clearly 
– I do not attribute anything to anyone. The surface syntax is altogether 
misleading. It will therefore be clearer if, instead of saying ‘I (really-)hurt’, I were 
to say ‘it hurts’ – as one says ‘it snows’ – or, better yet, I were simply to say 
‘HURT’. 
In short, I will both have become a solipsist, and given up speaking of ‘me’. 
And this is precisely why Wittgenstein tells us that:  
What the solipsist wants is not a notation in which the ego has a monopoly, but one in which the 
ego vanishes.14  
Admittedly, in charting the route from solipsism to selfless solipsism, 
Wittgenstein does not formulate anything quite as crisp as the Compositional 
Constraint. However, something like that Thesis is implicit in his remark that ‘if 
another cannot have my toothache, then also I – in this sense – cannot have it.’15 
The upshot, though, is that we have been led to what Canfield calls ‘the thesis 
of selfless solipsism’, which ‘lies at the heart of the Tractatus’.16 It is worth 
pausing to consider just how Tractarian this selfless solipsism is. When I say ‘he 
(kinda-)hurts’, I say something about a particular object in the world. However, I 
say nothing about any particular object when I say ‘I (really-)hurt’. As such, I 
draw no boundary between myself and the world. Indeed, if ‘my’ hurt – or, 
perhaps better, if HURT – belongs to anything, then it belongs to the entire world. 
Aphoristically: when ‘I’ am happy, the world waxes; when ‘I’ am sad, the world 
wanes; so that ‘I’ do not feature in the world at all, but appear as its limit.17 
                                                 
13 Including my own name. See Wittgenstein: The Blue Book, 61, 64–5, 68; NLPESD, 298; The Big 
Typescript, 512. 
14 Wittgenstein Philosophy (Ambrose), §19. See also Philosophical Remarks, §61; Philosophy (Moore), 
7:114, 8:29; Philosophy (Ambrose), §20; The Blue Book, 59–60, 66; NLPESD, 308; The Big Typescript, 
§512; Philosophical Investigations, §§402–3.  
15 Wittgenstein, The Big Typescript, 508. See also Philosophy (Moore), 8:14; The Blue Book, 55; 
NLPESD, 283; The Big Typescript, 504, 510; Philosophical Investigations, §398. 
16 John Canfield, ‘Tractatus objects’, Philosophia 6.1 (1976) 81–99, esp. 82. Canfield is of course writing 
about Wittgenstein, Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus (1921); henceforth cited as Tractatus. 
17 See Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §§5.632, 5.641, 6.43. 
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1.4  The grammar of ‘my pain’ 
So far, I have outlined a line of thought which begins with the Privacy Thesis, 
runs through the Dual-Meaning Thesis into the Solipsistic Thesis, and ends up 
with selfless solipsism. I now want to explain where this line of thought goes 
wrong. Wittgenstein gives us exactly the right answer: the mistake involves 
‘wavering between logical and physical impossibility’.18 But this needs some 
unpacking. 
Consider, again, the Privacy Thesis. On one good reading, it is just false to say 
‘I, and only I, can feel my pains’. Indeed, you have probably experienced at least 
some of my pains: like me, you may have suffered through dislocated shoulders 
and disappointments. 
This reading, however, treats the phrase ‘my pains’ quite generically. One 
could reasonably read the Thesis more specifically. So: whilst you may also have 
suffered the pain of dislocated shoulders, your pain was not the specific pain that I 
felt.  
That is no doubt true. But it also seems contingent, whereas the Privacy Thesis 
makes a claim about what is necessary. And that necessary claim remains in 
trouble. To see why, here is a thought-experiment, essentially due to Wittgenstein, 
which I will use frequently in what follows:19  
Sci-Fi Example. Gazillions of electrodes are attached to my body. These electrodes monitor the 
neural stimulations I am receiving, and send a copy to a super-computer. You are also attached to 
the super-computer with gazillions more electrodes. These subject you to exactly the same (type 
of) neural stimulations as I am receiving.  
In the Sci-Fi Example, there is a sense in which you feel all of my specific pains. 
And, since the Sci-Fi Example is possible – given a permissive enough notion of 
possibility – there is a sense in which you can feel all of my (specific) pains. In 
that sense, the Privacy Thesis is false.  
 To defend the Privacy Thesis, I might draw a type/token distinction. I might 
insist that, even in the Sci-Fi Example, I have my pain-token, and you have yours, 
and although these are of the same type, they are distinct pain-tokens.20 But to say 
this, I must introduce a new count-noun, ‘pain-token’; and introducing this noun 
does not seem compulsory.21 The mere fact that our bodies remain distinct, in the 
                                                 
18 Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, 56. 
19 Wittgenstein: Philosophy (Ambrose), §16; The Blue Book, 54. 
20 Thanks to Lucy O’Brien for suggesting something like this. 
21 I take it that this is the thrust of Wittgenstein’s remark: ‘What should this mean: he has these pains? 
apart from, that he has such pains: i.e. of such intensity, kind, etc. But only in that sense can I too have 
‘these pains’.’ The Big Typescript, 508.  
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Sci-Fi example, only requires that we speak of distinct people in pain, not of 
‘distinct pain-tokens’.  
 Still, even if we agree to say that you and I have ‘distinct pain-tokens’ in the 
Sci-Fi Example, the Privacy Thesis remains shaky. To show this, we can simply 
follow Wittgenstein in pushing the Sci-Fi Example further still. So, suppose that 
you and I are note merely wired together using a super-computer, but that we have 
‘a part of our bodies in common, say a hand’; that ‘the nerves and tendons of my 
arm and [yours are] connected to this hand by an operation. Now imagine the hand 
stung by a wasp. Both of us cry, contort our faces, give the same description of the 
pain, etc.’22 
 As Wittgenstein notes, I could refuse to count even this as a case where you 
feel my pain(-token). However, by now, there is nothing I could say to justify my 
refusal, beyond doggedly insisting: ‘If you feel it, it isn’t mine’.23 But that 
insistence would amount only to a grammatical proposal about how to use the 
phrase ‘my pain’ (or ‘the same pain’).24 Otherwise put: in an effort to defend the 
Privacy Thesis, I have turned it into a proposed rule of grammar. 
At this point, though, the Privacy Thesis has become completely harmless. 
After all, any grammatical proposal is optional. So, I could speak this way if I 
wanted to. But I must not make the mistake of thinking that my choice to speak a 
certain way has taught me anything new about the world, 25 or anything about 
what my words could possibly mean. 
2  Two uses of ‘I’ 
The discussion of §1 helps us to understand some of Wittgenstein’s remarks 
concerning privacy and solipsism in the early-to-mid 1930s. It also, I hope, 
defuses one particular impulse towards solipsism. However, a few reminders 
about the grammar of ‘my pain’ will not defuse all possible impulses towards 
solipsism.  
With this in mind, I now want to turn to a more famous target: Wittgenstein’s 
claim that the word ‘I’ has two uses. For that is the main target of this paper. 
                                                 
22 Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, 54.  See also Philosophy (Moore), 7:113, 8:11. 
23 Wittgenstein, Philosophy (Moore), 8:11. See also The Blue Book, 54. 
24 On grammatical statements, see Wittgenstein: Philosophy (Moore), 7:112–114, 8:6, 8:9–11; The Blue 
Book, 54; NLPESD, 283. The idea of proposing a rule comes through in Wittgenstein: Philosophy 
(Moore), 8:12–14; Philosophy (Ambrose), §16; NLPESD, 317–18. 
25 Cf. Wittgenstein: The Blue Book, 55, 70; NLPESD, 277. 
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2.1  The two uses, in context 
Wittgenstein moves immediately from a discussion of solipsism – along the lines 
sketched in §1 – into the passage where he distinguishes two uses of ‘I’:  
Now the idea that the real I lives in my body is connected with the peculiar grammar of the word 
‘I’, and the misunderstandings this grammar is liable to give rise to. There are two difference cases 
in the use of the word “I” (or “my”) which I might call “the use as object” and “the use as subject”. 
Examples of the first kind of use are these: “My arm is broken”, “I have grown six inches”, “I have 
a bump on my forehead”, “The wind blows my hair about”. Examples of the second kind are “I see 
so-and-so”, “I hear so-and-so”, “I try to lift my arm”, “I think it will rain”, “I have toothache”. One 
can point to the difference between these two categories by saying: The cases of the first category 
involve the recognition of a particular person, and there is in these cases the possibility of an error, 
or as I should rather put it: The possibility of an error has been provided for.26  
A vast literature cites this passage as alerting us to an important phenomenon.27 
However, that literature rarely considers why Wittgenstein was interested in the 
phenomenon. Indeed, when this passage is cited, the first sentence is usually 
omitted. But that sentence shows clearly that Wittgenstein wants to connect the 
temptation towards solipsism – which I discussed in §1 – with misunderstanding 
the grammar of the two uses of ‘I’. As such, the vast literature citing this passage 
has taken us to interesting places, but very different ones than Wittgenstein 
intended. 
In the rest of this paper, my aim is to do what that literature does not: to revisit 
Wittgenstein’s work, with the aim of showing both why the subject-use of ‘I’ 
threatens to lead us to solipsism, and how solipsism is to be avoided. 
2.2  Subjectivality and objectivality 
I will start by unpacking the passage a little. Wittgenstein states that the distinctive 
feature of the object-use of ‘I’ is that it ‘involve[s] the recognition of a particular 
person’, and that in such cases one can make a mistake about who the person is. 
To unpack this remark, I will flesh out each of Wittgenstein’s four exemplar 
object-uses of ‘I’:  
                                                 
26 Wittgenstein: The Blue Book, 66–7. See also Philosophy (Moore), 7:110, 8:8, 8:22–3, 8:27–8, 8:31–2, 
8:35–6; The Big Typescript, 511. 
27 This literature gets going with Sydney Shoemaker, ‘Self-reference and self-awareness’, The Journal of 
Philosophy 65.19 (1968), 555–67, and Evans, The Varieties of Reference, 179–91, 205–57. 
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Broken Arm Example. I am in a rugby scrum, which collapses. I ‘feel a pain in my arm, see a 
broken arm at my side, and think it is mine’.28 So I exclaim “My arm is broken”. But the arm I take 
to be my own is not mine, but someone else’s.  
Growth Example. My parents have been measuring me and my siblings, regularly making marks 
on the kitchen wall corresponding to our height (and writing the date alongside). Comparing two of 
these marks, I say “I have grown six inches”. But I am actually looking at marks my parents made 
for my sister, rather than for me.  
Mirror Example. Looking at what I take to be my reflection, I see a bump on what I take to be my 
forehead. I say “I have a bump on my forehead”. But I am not looking at my reflection. Instead, I 
am looking at an actor who is disguised like me and shadowing my every move; but he and only he 
has a bump on his forehead.  
The final case is ‘the wind blows my hair about’. To deal with this, I could re-use 
the Mirror Example. But, both because it will both prove helpful later, and also 
because it provides a connection with the material from earlier sections, I will deal 
with by using a variant of the Sci-Fi Example from §1.4:  
Sci-Fi Example (variant). Unbeknownst to me, Chip and I are wired into the set up of the Sci-Fi 
example, with me as the recipient of all the neural stimulations that Chip’s body receives. Now, on 
the basis of (what I take to be) tell-tale sensations in my scalp, I exclaim “the wind blows my hair 
about”. But, Chip’s hair, not mine, is being blown about.  
To capture what is at work in these examples, and in Wittgenstein’s general 
distinction, I will now offer a schematic definition:29  
Definition. The statement ‘I am φ’ is OBJECTIVAL iff there is a possible scenario where (a) I have 
grounds to believe that I am φ, but (b) given more information about the scenario, my original 
grounds would instead give me with grounds to believe that someone else is φ. Otherwise, the 
statement ‘I am φ’ is SUBJECTIVAL. (Similar definitions can be offered for statements involving 
‘me’, ‘my’, etc.) 
                                                 
28 Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, 67. 
29 I intend for this to be a universal generalisation of a definition due to Crispin Wright, in ‘Self-
knowledge: The Wittgensteinian legacy’, 19. (Printed in Knowing our Own Minds, ed. by Wright et al 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).) Let g be some grounds for making a judgement; then Wright 
says that a statement is IEM-given-g iff g is ‘such that in the event that the statement in question is 
somehow defeated, it cannot survive as a ground for the corresponding existential generalization.’ That 
is: a statement is subjectival iff it is IEM-given-g for all g that might justify the statement.  
Wittgenstein’s subject-use of ‘I’ certainly corresponds to the universal formulation. This is clear from the 
fact that ‘the wind blows my hair about’ is IEM-given-g, when g is just ordinary sensations of my own 
scalp. But there is a much deeper point here. In §2.3, I show that Wittgenstein links his subject-use of ‘I’ 
to statements concerning pure phenomenology, or sense data. As I show, that link is necessary, for 
statements which are IEM-given-g for all g (i.e. subjectival statements). But there is no such general link 
for statements which are IEM-given-g for some g.   
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I hope it is immediately clear that Wittgenstein’s four examples of subject-uses of 
‘I’ are subjectival, and that his four examples of object-uses of ‘I’ are objectival. 
But, to make it completely explicit, consider the Sci-Fi (variant) Example. Here, 
(a) my tell-tale sensations give me grounds to believe that the wind blows my hair 
about; but (b) if I were to discover that I was wired up to Chip, then those tell-tale 
sensations would cease to give my any grounds for thinking that that the wind 
blows my hair about, and would instead give me grounds to believe that the wind 
blows Chip’s hair about.  
2.3  Subjectival statements as descriptions of phenomenology 
In fact, having worked through the Sci-Fi (variant) example in detail once, it 
should be clear that Sci-Fi setups can be used to highlight the objectivality of any 
of Wittgenstein’s exemplar object-uses of ‘I’. Recognising this will allow me to 
show why Wittgenstein claimed that subjectival statements are attempts to 
describe phenomenology. 
Any statement ‘I am φ’ which says something physical about me is objectival. 
To see this, consider again the Sci-Fi Example (variant) from §1.4. There, I judge 
that the wind blows my hair about, when in fact Chip’s hair is being blown about 
and I am receiving sensations from his scalp; so my claim is objectival. We can 
raise similar issues for any physical attribution that I could justifiably form on a 
sensory basis.30 For example: the statement ‘I am seated’ is objectival, since I may 
say this because I am receiving Chip’s proprioceptive signals. Similarly, the 
statement ‘a tree is in front of me’ is objectival, since I may make this claim 
because I am receiving the signals from Chip’s retinas. Generalising, enough Sci-
Fi thinking will show that any statement which says something physical about me 
– any claim about my posture, my body, or my immediate environment – is 
objectival. 
Consequently, if we are looking for subjectival statements, then we must turn 
our attention from physical attributions to mental attributions.31 But this has a 
knock-on effect. Many attributions are mixed, and we must bracket the physical 
components of such attributions.32 To illustrate: suppose I say ‘I am hungry’, but 
                                                 
30 A similar point is made by François Recanati in Perspectival Thought: A plea for (moderate) relativism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 149–50. This disagrees with Shoemaker, ‘Self-reference and 
self-awareness’, 556–7. 
31 NB: I do not ultimately want to endorse the idea that there is such a sharp distinction. My aim here is 
just to investigate what kind of content subjectival claims could possibly have (with the ultimate aim, in 
§4, of showing that must have (almost) none). 
32 Carnap, Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928), §64, introduces the word ‘bracket’ in outlining his 
methodological solipsism: ‘the experiences must simply be taken as they occur. We shall not claim 
reality or nonreality in connection with these experiences; rather, these claims will be ‘bracketed’ (i.e., 
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then discover that the situation is Sci-Fi, and that I am receiving the hunger pangs 
from Chip’s body rather than my own. In this situation, I may reasonably want to 
say ‘it is Chip (not me) who is hungry’.33 This suggests a good sense in which the 
statement ‘I am hungry’ is objectival. Conversely, if my statement is supposed to 
be subjectival, then we must take the claim to involve only ‘narrow’ content; 
roughly, to concern only what is going on ‘in my head’. Then we can say: even if I 
am hungry in the narrow sense, only because Chip is hungry in the flesh-and-
blood sense and I am being sent signals from Chip’s body, still, this in no way 
threatens that I am hungry in the required (narrow) sense. That is: everything 
physical must be bracketed from any subjectival claims. 
Similarly, any notion of duration must be bracketed away from subjectival 
claims. Consider ‘I was hungry’. Even after we have bracketed the question of 
exactly whose stomach rumbled, this past-tensed statement remains objectival. 
After all, I may say ‘I was hungry’ because I seem to remember being hungry, 
when in fact these are not my own memories of hunger but rather Chip’s 
memories, which have been implanted in me by some (further) Sci-Fi mechanism. 
On discovering this, I may reasonably way to say ‘it was Chip (not me) who was 
hungry’.34 
Subjectival claims must, therefore, be restricted to present-tensed, mental 
judgements.35 And only a little more generalising should convince you that 
subjectival statements concern nothing but sense data, or pure phenomenology, or 
some-such.36 
Wittgenstein was aware of all of this. In a lecture on 6 March 1933, 
Wittgenstein introduced the idea that ‘I’ has two uses. But he then immediately 
insisted that ‘I might have tooth-ache, even if there were no body – if my body 
was destroyed’, when the ‘I’ is used as subject.37 He repeated the same point about 
toothache later in that lecture,38 and also offered another example: ‘“This sound 
                                                                                                                                      
we will exercise the phenomenological ‘withholding of judgment’, ἐποχή, in Husserl’s sense).’ Hacker, 
Wittgenstein: Meaning and mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 481–6, provides interesting commentary on 
Wittgenstein’s relationship with methodological solipsism. 
33 Cf. Evans, The Varieties of Reference, 219–20. 
34 Such quasi-memories have been frequently discussed in this literature, post-Evans, The Varieties of 
Reference, 235–48. 
35 Note: present-tensed and not present-continuous. Suppose I judge that I am composing a poem. This 
involves some ongoing activity: it suggests that I was composing it, and will continue to compose it. 
However, via something elaborately Sci-Fi, I can make sense of discovering that my apparent memories 
of composing the poem are really Chip’s memories, and of discovering that Chip (not me) will continue 
to compose the poem. So, if we want an apparently present-continuous claim to be subjectival, we must 
bracket such claims down to instantaneous versions of those judgement. 
36 Note: they can involve the phenomenology of intention, as in Wittgenstein’s example “I try to lift my 
arm”. However, the subjectival use should not connote any ‘authorship’. To see why, consider a Sci-Fi 
set-up where Chip’s intentions are being transmitted into my head. 
37 Wittgenstein, Philosophy (Moore), 8.32.  
38 Wittgenstein, Philosophy (Moore), 8:35; see also Philosophy (Ambrose), §19; The Big Typescript, 514. 
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moves round my head clockwise” has meaning independently of the physical 
head.’39 In fact, the connection to phenomenology is completely explicitly in The 
Blue Book. Three pages after introducing his two uses of ‘I’, he wraps up his 
discussion of the subject-use, and says:  
In fact one may say that what in these investigations we were concerned with was the grammar of 
those words describing what are called “mental activities”: seeing, hearing, feeling, etc. And this 
comes to the same thing as saying that we are concerned with the grammar of ‘phrases describing 
sense data’.40  
So, when Wittgenstein offers “I see so-and-so” and “I hear so-and-so” as exemplar 
subjectival statements, he (implicitly) takes it that everything physical is bracketed 
from such statements; that they concern only first-personal phenomenology.  
2.4  From phenomenology to solipsism 
Once we have recognised that subjectival claims amount to descriptions of 
phenomenology, however, there is a very quick route to solipsism.  
We have seen that if I say (subjectivally) ‘I hurt’, then my claim amounts to a 
description of my phenomenology. By contrast, a claim like ‘he hurts’ does not 
concern my phenomenology.41 As such, I must insist that the sense of the 
predicate ‘x hurts’ is totally different, when we consider ‘I hurt’ (understood 
subjectivally) rather than ‘he hurts’. That is, I will embrace the Dual-Meaning 
Thesis of §1.2. To mark the difference, I will want to use ‘x really-hurts’ for 
subjectival statements, and ‘x kinda-hurts’ for other people.42 And so, exactly as in 
§1.2, I will arrive at the (meaning-theoretic) Solipsistic Thesis. 
In short, thinking about subjectivality has given fresh life to the Dual-Meaning 
Thesis, and thereby renewed the threat of solipsism. Moreover, the renewed threat 
is much harder to deal with than the original threat. Indeed, Wittgenstein’s own 
response to this threat seems to emerge only gradually, over months or maybe 
years. Roughly, his thought progression is characterised by the following stages:  
(1) The word ‘I’, as it occurs in subjectival statements, does not refer to 
anything.   
                                                 
39 Wittgenstein, Philosophy (Moore), 8:35. 
40 Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, 70. 
41 Or rather, if it does, it does so only indirectly, as in e.g. Carnap’s Aufbau. 
42 And also for any objectival statements of pain. 
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This claim rebuts any version of solipsism which insists that some particular self 
is privileged. And this line of thought is clear from Wittgenstein’s 1933 lectures 
onwards. However,   
(2) Claim (1) is compatible with selfless solipsism. 
Moreover, there are certain hints of selfless solipsism in the 1933 lectures. That 
said,  
(3) We can avoid solipsism, of any form, by regarding subjectival utterances 
as more like moans than judgements.  
This line of thought is floated in The Blue Book. But Wittgenstein’s decisive 
answer to solipsism comes when he realises that:  
(4) Considerations about private languages show that (almost) no truth-apt 
content can be attached to any subjectival utterance. 
There are a few hints of this in The Blue Book, but the idea becomes much clearer 
in subsequent lecture notes.  
 In the rest of this paper, I will run through these four chronological stages of 
Wittgenstein’s engagement with solipsism, considering stages (1)–(3) in the next 
section, and paving the way for the real answer to solipsism in §4 
3  Referring and moaning 
3.1  ‘I’ as not referring 
The main line of thought, in both Wittgenstein’s 1933-lectures and The Blue Book, 
is this: the word ‘I’, as it occurs in a subjectival statement, does not refer to a 
particular self. Here, I will outline why Wittgenstein says this; in the next 
subsection, I will explain why this does not really answer the solipsist.  
As explained in §2.3, subjectival statements are just attempts to describe 
phenomenology. As a matter of phenomenology, though, when I see a red patch, I 
do not observe myself seeing a red patch; I simply visually experience redness. 
Likewise, to use an example from Wittgenstein, ‘The experience of feeling a 
toothache isn’t the experience that a person, I, has something.’43 More generally, 
                                                 
43 Wittegnstein, Big Typescript, 506.  
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according to Wittgenstein, the ‘truth is: No person necessarily enters into a 
sensory experience at all.’44 His point here is simply a rewording of Hume’s 
observation that ‘when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always 
stumble on some particular perception or other[…]. I never can catch myself at any 
time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception’.45 
The upshot is this. Since subjectival statements are descriptions of 
phenomenology, and I am not an element of the phenomenology, the word ‘I’ in a 
subjectival statement does not refer to me. So, when I (subjectivally) claim ‘I 
hurt’, I do not attribute anything to anyone. As in §1.3, then, it would be less 
misleading for me to say ‘it hurts’, or simply ‘HURT’. In short: I disappear from 
subjectival statements.46  
3.2  Selfless solipsism remains standing 
Unfortunately, though, we cannot refute solipsism just by showing that the word 
‘I’ does not refer when used in a subjectival statement. 
In his Blue Book discussion of subjectivality, Wittgenstein clearly sets out the 
following line of thought. Before we investigate the ‘grammar’ of subjectival 
statements, we might think that the word ‘I’ must always refers to something. But, 
when we make a subjectival claim ‘I am φ’, it seems that we do not use the word 
‘I’ to refer to some person that we have recognized by their ‘bodily characteristics; 
and this creates the illusion that we use this word to refer to something bodiless, 
which, however, has its seat in our body.’47 To defeat this illusion, then, it is 
sufficient to show that, in these cases, the word ‘I’ does not refer to anything after 
all. That is: by better understanding ‘the peculiar grammar of the word “I”’, we 
will rid ourselves of ‘the idea that the real I lives in my body’.48  
Overcoming (this caricature of) Cartesian metaphysics is certainly some 
achievement.49 Moreover, the line of thought that tells against (caricatured) 
                                                 
44 Wittgenstein, Philosophy (Moore), 8:6; see also Philosophy (Moore), 8:2, 8:4, 8:8; Philosophy 
(Ambrose), §19; NLPESD, 282; The Big Typescript, 506. 
45 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Bk.1, Pt.IV, §VI. See also Carnap, Aufbau, §65: ‘the given 
is subject-less’. See also Schlick, ‘Meaning and verification’, The Philosophical Review 45.4 (1936), 
339–69, esp. 367. 
46 See Wittgenstein: Philosophy (Moore), 8:22–3, 8:39; Philosophy (Ambrose), §18; The Blue Book, 67; 
NLPESD, 307. 
47 Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, 70. 
48 Both quotes in this sentence from Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, 67. 
49 Ambrose remarks that Wittgenstein examined ‘the Cartesian question, as though it does not concern a 
fact of the world but rather a matter of expression’. Ambrose, ‘The Yellow Book notes in relation to The 
Blue Book’, Crítica 9.26 (1977) 3–23, esp. 9. This is clearly also a theme of G.E.M. Anscombe, ‘The 
first person’, in Mind and Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975, ed. by Samuel 
Guttenplan), 45–65. 
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Cartesian metaphysics also tells against the specifically metaphysical version of 
solipsism which insists that one particular self – MYSELF – is somehow at the 
centre of the universe.  
In this paper, though, I have focussed on a meaning-theoretic version of 
solipsism, as characterised via the Solipsistic Thesis in §1.2. And this meaning-
theoretic solipsism does not take any stance on whether ‘I’ refers in subjectival 
statements. Indeed, we saw in §1.3 that meaning-theoretic solipsism leads, via the 
Compositional Constraint, to selfless solipsism. And we obviously cannot criticise 
this version of solipsism, by insisting that subjectival uses of ‘I’ do not refer to any 
self. 
Worse: insisting that subjectival uses of ‘I’ do not refer actually exacerbates 
the the threat of selfless solipsism. We can see this by rehashing some ideas from 
§1.3. When I say ‘Ali hurts’, I simply state a fact about Ali, an object in the world. 
But if ‘I’ does not refer when I (subjectivally) say ‘I hurt’, then I do not thereby 
attribute (real) pain to any object in the world. I draw no boundary between 
myself and the world, and so attribute HURT to the world itself. And that is selfless 
solipsism. 
In short, many of Wittgenstein’s remarks in 1933–4 actually seem to entail 
selfless solipsism. And it is not immediately obvious that this would be contrary to 
Wittgenstein’s aims. After all, Wittgenstein had once claimed that ‘what solipsism 
means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but shows itself.’50 Perhaps he still 
believed, in 1933–4, that ‘the I of solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point, and 
there remains the reality coordinated with it’.51 
In fact, the textual evidence is too thin to form a firm judgement on 
Wittgenstein’s views in 1933. But it worth noting that Wittgenstein’s 1933-
lectures, preceding The Blue Book, contain nothing concrete about how to avoid 
this route to (selfless) solipsism. We have, for example:  
Solipsism is right, if it merely says: “I have tooth-ache” is on quite a different level from “He has 
tooth-ache”. ¶ If he says that he has something which the other has not; he is absurd & is making 
the very mistake of putting the 2 on the same level.52  
Wittgenstein clearly says that it ‘is absurd’ to embrace the metaphysical version of 
solipsism, which insists that MYSELF is the centre of the universe. But the rest of 
what he says is quite compatible with selfless, meaning-theoretic, solipsism.  
If it were true that this ‘solipsism, strictly carried through, coincides with pure 
realism’53 – as Wittgenstein had claimed in the Tractatus – then perhaps we could 
                                                 
50 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §5.62. 
51 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §5.64. 
52 Wittgenstein, Philosophy (Moore), 8:29. See also Philosophy (Ambrose), §20. 
53 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §5.64. 
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live with it. However, if I arrive at selfless solipsism by the route outlined in §2, 
then my world will not coincide with the world of the realist, but will instead 
retain a detestably solipsistic residue. For, as things stand, I will have two 
languages: our ordinary language, and also a phenomenological language. Once I 
have recognised that a subjectival use of ‘I’ does not refer to anything, I will stop 
saying that the phenomenological language makes claims about me or about my 
experiences.54 Still, to describe the world in its entirety, I will need to use both 
languages. And there will be no possible comparison between ordinary, as 
described in ordinary language and attributed to ordinary human beings, and (real) 
HURT, as described in (my the?) phenomenological language, and attributed to (the 
limits of) the world. That, surely, is unacceptable. 
3.4  Expressivism avoids solipsism 
As mentioned: I am not sure about Wittgenstein’s explicit views on selfless 
solipsism in his 1933-lectures. Fortunately, though, his Blue Book contains some 
remarks which commit him to denying that there is any truth in selfless solipsism. 
In §3.3, I suggested that selfless solipsism is not just compatible with the idea 
that subjectival uses of ‘I’ do not refer, but is entailed by that idea. However, my 
argument implicitly depended on the premise that subjectival utterances express 
bona fide judgements. The problem, in a nutshell, is that any judgement I make 
would draw no boundary between myself and the world. But, if I make no 
judgement in saying (subjectivally) ‘I hurt’, then I neither ascribe anything to me 
nor to the world. (There is no HURT, and no unacceptably solipsistic residue.) 
In principle, there are many ways to flesh out the idea that I make no 
judgement in saying ‘I hurt’. But a specific account, known as expressivism, holds 
this:  
Expressivist Thesis. Uttering ‘I hurt’ is on a par with moaning in pain. Neither action amounts to 
asserting something truth-apt; the actions simply evince pain. 
Expressivists have nothing to fear from selfless solipsism. Whilst my words ‘I 
hurt’ make no reference to me, nor do my moans, and nothing deep follows from 
either fact. So, by adopting expressivism, it is possible to maintain that subjectival 
uses of ‘I’ do not refer, whilst avoiding selfless solipsism. Perhaps, then, this is 
why Wittgenstein suggested that ‘[t]o say, “I have pain” is no more a statement 
                                                 
54 Instead, I might say that this language distributes ‘the use of the word “I” over all human bodies as 
opposed to [L.W.] alone’. Wittgenstein, NLPESD, 281; also NLPESD, 298; The Big Typescript, 516. 
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about a particular person than moaning is’;55 it would allow him to avoid sliding 
into an unacceptable solipsism.  
This is a step in the right direction. However, it does not provide much by way 
of an answer an already-committed solipsist. As it stands, the selfless solipsist will 
just disagree with expressivism, and insist that his (subjectival) claim ‘I hurt’ 
really does express a full-fledged judgement. What we need is an argument that he 
is wrong. Hence, with Wittgenstein, we find ourselves saying:  
The solipsist flutters and flutters in the fly-bottle, bashes against the walls, flutters on. How is he to 
be brought to rest?’56 
In fact, the solipsist is to be brought to rest by developing a private language 
argument. 
4  Private languages 
Wittgenstein’s ‘Notes for lectures on “private experience” and “sense data”’ 
contain a fairly detailed prototype of his private language argument.57 Over 
several pages, Wittgenstein raises issues which his Philosophical Investigations 
will later make famous. These issues include: what it could mean to ‘name’ a 
sensation type; what it could mean for sensations at different times to be of ‘the 
same type’; and what a necessarily private ‘justification’ could be. Robinson 
Crusoe even makes a cameo appearance. 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of private languages ends by considering the 
complaint that he has neglected ‘the very essence of experience’.58 Almost 
immediately after this, Wittgenstein briefly revisits his two uses of ‘I’.59 
Unfortunately, he does not make an explicit connection between these two points 
(perhaps because these are only lecture notes). My aim is to plug this gap, and to 
show how thoughts in the vicinity of Wittgenstein’s private language argument 
show that subjectival statements must lack (almost) any public content. 
                                                 
55 Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, 67; see also The Blue Book, 68; NLPESD, 301–2, 309, 319. 
56 Wittgenstein, NLPESD, 300; then compare Philosophical Investigations, §309. 
57 Wittgenstein, NLPESD, roughly 287–97. 
58 Wittgenstein, NLPESD, 297; and compare Philosophical Investigations, §§304–6. 
59 ‘“I see so-and-so” does not mean “the person so-and-so, e.g., L.W., sees so-and-so”.’ Wittgenstein, 
NLPESD, 298. 
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4.1  A quick connection to private languages 
It is tempting to draw the following, straightforward connection between 
subjectivality and Wittgenstein’s private language argument:60 
 
(a) Subjectival statements are attempts to describe phenomenology. 
(b) If phenomenology can be successfully described at all, then it must be 
described in a necessarily private language. 
(c) If Wittgenstein’s private language argument is correct, then there cannot 
be a necessarily private language. 
So: if Wittgenstein's private language argument is correct, then there can be no 
successful subjectival statements.  
 
I established premise (a) in §2.3, and (c) is uncontentious. Moreover, (b) is 
certainly plausible. However, nothing I have said so far forces it upon us. For 
example, it is not immediately obvious that a narrowly phenomenological 
description of my pains could not help a doctor to diagnose my illness. So, in what 
follows, I will allow that (b) might be false, but will show how Wittgenstein’s 
early discussion of private languages provides us with materials for showing that 
subjectival statements lack (almost) all public content. 
4.2  Subjectival statements and testimony 
In §2.3, I explained that everything physical must be bracketed from subjectival 
claims. In fact, we must also bracket anything relating to testimony. To see why, 
consider an example due to Coliva:61  
                                                 
60 Thanks to Rob Trueman for suggesting I consider this quick argument. 
61 Annalisa Coliva, ‘Which “key to all mythologies” about the self? A note on where the illusions of 
transcendence came from and how to resist them’, in Prosser and Recanati, eds., Immunity to Error 
through Misidentification: New essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 22–45), 26. For a very 
similar example, see Frédérique Vignemont, ‘Bodily immunity to error’ (same volume, 224–46), 224. 
For a slightly different use of testimony, Daniel Morgan ‘Immunity to error through misidentification: 
What does it tell us about the de se?’ (same volume, 103–23), 107. 
In fact, Wittgenstein explicitly considers subconscious thoughts whenever he considers subjectivality. For 
example, he asks why we might ever say something like ‘x has a subconscious toothache’, and 
concludes that the meaning of this phrase would have to be ‘bound up with a human body: I couldn’t 
have it, if my body were destroyed.’ (Philosophy (Moore), 8:35; see also The Blue Book, 55, 57–8.) This 
contrasts with the insistence that I (subjectivally) can have conscious toothache, even if I have no body 
at all (see §2.3). That is: Wittgenstein would indeed have classified any claim about the subconscious as 
objectival. 
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Testimony Example. I am attending group therapy sessions. The therapist leading the group tells 
me that my behaviour reveals that, deep down, I hate myself. I trust her testimony, and so I claim ‘I 
hate myself’. But in fact the therapist is talking to someone else in the group, not me.  
As such, the statement ‘I hate myself’ is objectival, at least as ordinarily 
understood. Contraposing, subjectival statements cannot involve any content 
which could be connected with the testimony of other people. 
 
However, the impact of testimony extends beyond the purview of subconcious 
thought. In lecture notes dated shortly after The Blue Book, Wittgenstein makes 
this note: ‘Can a man doubt whether what he sees is red or green? (Elaborate 
this.)’62 I will elaborate on this, on Wittgenstein’s behalf, by using a variant of the 
Testimony Example:  
Relearning Example. Several of us have had an unfortunate accident and, as a result, we must all 
relearn our colour-words. I am staring at a colour-swatch, and my teacher says ‘you’re seeing red’. 
So I claim ‘I see red’. But in fact the teacher is talking to someone else in the group, who is staring 
at a different swatch.  
As Wittgenstein required, this sort of Example generates a situation – admittedly, 
a rare one – in which a man – me – can legitimately doubt whether what he sees is 
red or green. But now I want to focus on what this Example teaches us about 
subjectival claims. 
 In the Relearning Example, we may take it that my colour-words pertain to the 
physical swatches. In that case, my claim ‘I see red’ is objectival; indeed, it is as 
objectival as ‘I have a red swatch in my hand’, and for the same reason. However, 
this is no surprise. In §2.3, we saw that my subjectival claims must be a 
description of my phenomenology, and not (for example) an attempt to describe 
some physical swatch. To make the Relearning Example interesting, then, we 
should assume that, in the Relearning Example, I am saying ‘I see red’ in an effort 
to describe my phenomenology . 
Now, in §4.1, we considered the following:  
(b) If phenomenology can be successfully described at all, then it must be 
described in a necessarily private language.  
If we assume this, then I must offer ‘I see red’ in a necessarily private language. In 
that case, nothing the teacher might say in a public language could either give me 
any grounds for saying ‘I see red’, nor count against my saying that. At that point, 
the Relearning Example will become wholly irrelevant to the question of whether 
my claim ‘I see red’ is subjectival or objectival.  
                                                 
62 Wittgenstein, NLPESD, 282. 
20 
However, as explained in §4.1, I do not want to assume (b). Instead, I am 
assuming that we can (try to) describe phenomenology in a public language. And 
in that case, the Relearning Example remains relevant to my claim ‘I see red’. 
Indeed, if we assume that we can (try to) describe phenomenology in a public 
language, then we must conceive of the Relearning Example as follows: by 
directly teaching us the names for the physical colours, the teacher is indirectly 
teaching us the names for the (our?) phenomenological colours.63 And on this 
understanding, the Relearning Example has this structure: I take it that the teacher 
was indirectly saying something about my phenomenology, when in fact she is 
indirectly saying something about someone else’s phenomenology. If I were to 
find all this out, I would stop saying ‘I see red’, but would remain justified in 
saying ‘someone else sees red’.  
In short: if my statement ‘I see red’ describes my phenomenology in a public 
language, then my statement is objectival. Conversely, if I want to insist that my 
statement is subjectival, then I must bracket the intended meaning of my 
statement, so that it is narrower even than an attempt to describe phenomenology. 
64 
4.3  ‘Hello, World!’ 
In fact, though, the amount of bracketing that is required would leave ‘I see red’ 
with (almost) no public content at all. To show this, I will consider various 
attempts to express the supposedly remaining content in a public language, and 
show why they fail.  
I might start by suggesting the following:  
‘The public content of a subjectival utterance of “I see red” is roughly that of “I see this colour”. 
For I grant that someone else saw red; but I cannot doubt that I saw this colour.’  
However, ‘this colour’ is a demonstrative, and – in Wittgensteinian spirit – you 
should ask me what is demonstrated. I might respond by accompanying the word 
‘this colour’ by a gesture, perhaps pointing at the colour-swatch I am looking at. 
                                                 
63 Cf. Wittgenstein, NLPESD, 285, 301. 
64 Whilst I will focus on examples concerning Relearning, it is instructive to note that a similar point can 
be made by considering mis-speaking. Example. I encounter a woman who is groaning in agony. I call 
an ambulance, and wait with her. When a paramedic arrives, I try to explain the situation. I say ‘I hurt, 
she is fine’. The paramedic looks at us both, confused, and says ‘Really? You seem ok.’ I realise my 
mistake: ‘Yes, I mixed up my words; she hurts, rather than me’. With Hilary Putnam, I think it is a 
mistake to dismiss this kind of phenomenon as a (mere) ‘slip of the tongue’. As Putnam points out, ‘in 
the case in question I didn’t even notice I was misdescribing until someone questioned my report (and 
might never have noticed otherwise)’. See Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), 70. 
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But this will bring me back to the colour of swatches, and away from my 
phenomenology. So I will be tempted, instead, to insist that my words ‘this colour’ 
are accompanied by some inner, mental version of pointing. I want, as it were, to 
point to a location in my own visual field, or perhaps a spot in my inner colour-
space. But such an ‘inner pointing’ is, of course, utterly inarticulable, as 
Wittgenstein brought out as early as The Blue Book.65 If my aim is to convey 
something public, this is not the way to go.  
As such, I must give up on any attempt to say something specific about colour 
– whether by using a name or a demonstration – in a public language. So I must 
make my claim more generic. I might try suggesting: 
‘The public content of a subjectival utterance of “I see red” is roughly that of “I see some colour”.’  
The Relearning Example does not threaten this claim. However, we can bring it 
into jeopardy just by slightly tweaking the Example. Imagine that the group is 
being taught names, not just for colours, but also for textures. I am rubbing a 
swatch of hessian, and hear the teacher say ‘you’re seeing red’. I take her to be 
addressing me, and so say, ‘I see red’. But in fact, the teacher is speaking to 
someone else. My eyes are closed, and I am seeing nothing, but feeling hessian. 
And this example directly connects with one of Wittgenstein’s own remarks about 
private languages: if my aim is to provide my own labels for my phenomenology, 
[…] then how can I call it a colour? Isn’t it just as uncertain that I mean by ‘colour’ what they 
mean as that I mean by ‘red’ what they mean? And the same applies of course for ‘seeing’.66 
Summing up: I have been led to acknowledge that the public content I would 
express by saying (subjectivally) ‘I see red’ must be even thinner than what I 
would express by saying ‘I see [something]’. And at this point, I must simply 
concede that there is no public content left to my claim that ‘I see red’, if it is 
supposed to be subjectival. Or rather: the only content which could possibly 
remain is the sort of content that is usually conveyed with a claim like ‘I am 
conscious’. And, since the content is to be public, we should not hear either claim 
as uttered in hushed, reverential tones – as flagging some deep riddle of 
consciousness – but as if they had been said by someone who has woken up from 
their anaesthetic and wishes to indicate that they are once again receptive to 
stimuli. It is a version of the ‘Hello, World!’ that one uses to show that a system is 
(barely) functioning. 
                                                 
65 Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, 64–6; NLPESD, 307–11, 320; Philosophical Investigations, §398. 
66 Wittgenstein, NLPESD, 288. See also Philosophical Investigations, §398. 
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4.4  Solipsism avoided 
I have established that subjectival claims must lack (almost) any public content. It 
only remains to show how this allows us to avoid solipsism.  
The route to solipsism outlined in §2 ran as follows: in considering 
subjectivality, I realise that my aim is to describe pure phenomenology, and so I 
embrace the Dual-Meaning Thesis. However, once I have seen what I would have 
to bracket in the face of the Relearning Example, I am no longer compelled 
towards the Dual-Meaning Thesis. Certainly, the sense of ‘x hurts’ would have to 
be different, when on the one hand I say ‘he (kinda-)hurts’, and on the other hand I 
try to make a subjectival claim ‘I (really-)hurt’. But this is not because my ‘I 
(really-)hurt’ describes real pain, as it were; rather, it is because it fails to describe 
anything. It is the difference between saying something of an object, and saying 
‘Hello, World!’ 
The crucial point in the refutation of solipsism, then, is as follows. If ‘I hurt’ 
expresses more than an utterly minimal public content, then it must be objectival. 
Now, this point is quite compatible with expressivism, as discussed in §3.4. But it 
is equally compatible with rejecting expressivism. Expressivism is just orthogonal 
to the real refutation of solipsism. 
5  Conclusion 
In this paper, I have reopened Wittgenstein’s ‘grammatical’ investigation of 
solipsism. The point I have arrived at is something like a grammatical correlate of 
a classic rebuttal to phenomenalism.  
According to a certain kind of phenomenalist, we ‘start’ with sense data and 
construct ordinary objects from them. The classic rebuttal is that we do not ‘start’ 
with sense data. Rather, we ‘arrive’ at sense data, if at all, then by a process of 
abstracting from experiences of ordinary objects.  
The thought I have elaborated here is that we do not ‘start’ with contentful 
subjectival judgements, either in the natural, temporal order of things, or in any 
important ‘order of justification’. Rather, we arrive at such judgements by a 
process of bracketing ordinary judgements (if at all). However, when we really 
consider what such bracketing amounts to, they become (almost) contentless. 
In a nutshell, then, the route out of solipsism comes from Wittgenstein’s 
realisation that ‘“private experience” is a degenerate construction of our 
grammar’.67 Having seen this – via an early version of the private language 
                                                 
67 Wittgenstein, NLPESD, 314. 
23 
argument – he came to believe that ‘[t]here is not – as I earlier believed – a 
primary language, as opposed to our ordinary one’.68 As such, rather than 
venerating would-be subjectival claims, they can be disregarded as ‘that 
inarticulate sound with which some authors would like to begin philosophy.’69 
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